TLP:CLEAR ANALYST DOSSIER · SR/2026 · DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED STATUS: OPERATIONAL · ACCEPTING SUMMER 2027 SECURITY ASSIGNMENTS

THREAT ANALYSIS · CISCO CERTIFIED · (ISC)² CANDIDATE · BTJA

SERGIO
RODRIGUEZ

I build the tools defenders actually use: exposure assessment, STIG-style compliance auditing, and threat-intel pipelines mapped to NIST 800-53 and MITRE ATT&CK. B.S. Cybersecurity (Security Threat & Analysis), Iona University. End goal: taking cybercrime off the board.

Base
Fishkill, NY
Focus
Threat analysis · Blue team ops
Clearance to hire
Immediate
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FILE 01 · SUBJECT PROFILE

Who is on this file

I'm a threat analyst and security toolsmith from New York's Hudson Valley, starting my B.S. in Cybersecurity at Iona University this fall with a concentration in Security Threat & Analysis. I didn't wait for the degree to start building: the tooling on this page already exists, runs, and is documented.

My foundation is defensive: Cisco's cybersecurity certification, official (ISC)² Candidate status, and the complete BTJA blue-team pathway. On top of that I've stacked serious applied-AI training, Anthropic certifications covering the Claude API, Model Context Protocol, agent architectures, and enterprise deployment on AWS Bedrock and Google Cloud Vertex AI. That combination is why I can ship tools at this pace.

Outside the SOC, I compete internationally on the Great Highland Bagpipe: 1st place, North American Championship (Youth, 2025) and 8th at the World Championship in Glasgow (2024). Ten years of competition taught me what incident response also demands: disciplined practice and precision when it counts.

SubjectRodriguez, Sergio W.
RoleThreat Analyst · Security Toolsmith
EducationB.S. Cybersecurity, Iona University (from Fall 2026)
ConcentrationSecurity Threat & Analysis
LocationFishkill, NY · Hudson Valley / NYC metro
DispositionOperational · accepting Summer 2027 assignments
30Verified certificates
7Shipped projects
6Security tools built
1stN. American champion
FILE 02 · VERIFIED CREDENTIALS

Certifications on record

Every certificate below is verifiable: core credentials via Credly, Anthropic certificates as signed PDFs you can open right here.

FILE 03 · SECURITY TOOLING

Instruments built for defenders

Custom assessment tooling, packaged together as the Security Audit & Verification Suite on GitHub.

ArmSky · PolicyScout

FLAGSHIP · GOV NLP

GAMECHANGER-inspired semantic search + cited QA over DoD policy

  • Hybrid sparse-BM25 + TF-IDF retrieval, RRF fusion, MMR diversification
  • Cross-encoder-shaped reranker that lifted citation precision 0.94 → 1.00
  • Grounded LLM composer seam wired for Azure OpenAI Gov (IL5 deploy plan)
  • nDCG + citation-precision CI gates · Prometheus metrics · adversarial critique log

Built against the CDAO analytic-tools ecosystem (GAMECHANGER, Advana, JATIC). Every version ships an adversarial self-critique: assume it's broken until proven otherwise.

Detect Lab

FLAGSHIP · ATT&CK

A testable detection engine: Sigma-style rules over event logs, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK

  • Six ATT&CK techniques: encoded PowerShell, certutil transfer, defense evasion, discovery, brute force, C2 beaconing
  • Stateful sliding-window aggregation (brute force / beaconing) + stateless signatures
  • Precision/recall/F1 eval harness, gated in CI: a rule that flags docker run -p 8080 fails the build
  • Honest v0.1→v0.2 critique log: caught a real false positive (0.82 → 1.00 precision) and fixed it

Detection engineering treated like code: rules with tests and a measurable quality bar. Because a rule that cries wolf is worse than no rule.

RangeCheck

RECON / EXPOSURE

Authorized network exposure assessment

  • Async service discovery engine
  • Lightweight service fingerprinting
  • YAML-based finding classification with CVSS v3.1 metadata
  • HTML, JSON, and CSV reporting

ControlTrace

COMPLIANCE

Local baseline & compliance auditor

  • DISA STIG-style check definitions
  • Automated evidence collection
  • Maps controls to NIST SP 800-53 & MITRE ATT&CK
  • HTML, JSON, CSV, and POA&M reports

Tracer

THREAT INTEL

Threat intelligence pipeline

  • Multi-source feed ingestion & IOC enrichment
  • Elasticsearch search integration
  • Neo4j graph correlation engine
  • Flask REST API for analyst queries

dash

SOC OPS

Threat-intel operations platform

  • Feed ingestion & alert enrichment workflows
  • Indicator correlation engine
  • Analyst-facing API and dashboard views
FILE 03b · MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

Where my tooling touches the matrix

Techniques my tooling detects, audits against, or enriches; hover any lit cell. Honest coverage, not a checkbox wall. An analyst who maps his own work to ATT&CK is an analyst who understands the framework.

RangeCheck · exposure ControlTrace · hardening Tracer / dash · intel & detection
FILE 03c · LIVE THREAT INTELLIGENCE

Real threats, pulled live right now

Not a simulation. This board fetches current threat data on the edge from CISA and abuse.ch, the same feeds a working SOC uses. It refreshes every 30 minutes.

Connecting to live feeds…

Recently weaponized

CISA KEV

Loading current CVEs…

Active botnet C2

Feodo Tracker

Loading live C2 servers…

Fresh indicators

ThreatFox

Loading recent IOCs…

FILE 03d · EMERGING EXPOSURE · LEADING INDICATOR

Before it hits the KEV catalog

CISA KEV lists what's already weaponized. This board looks one step upstream: the newest CVEs from NVD, scored by EPSS — the probability a flaw gets exploited within 30 days — and filtered to the ones not yet in KEV. High EPSS + high CVSS + no KEV listing is the patch-it-now quadrant. Live, sourced, refreshed every 30 minutes.

Connecting to NVD + EPSS…

Ranking newest CVEs by exploitation probability…

Ranking = EPSS probability first, then CVSS severity, then recency. EPSS via FIRST.org; scores shift daily as exploitation signal accrues. This is public-data analysis, not a claim of private discovery.

FILE 03e · WEAPONIZATION LEAD TIME · PATCH RUNWAY

How long you actually have

Exploit search engines answer “does an exploit exist for this CVE?” — a question whose answer is eventually always yes, which makes it useless for ordering a patch queue. The question that does reorder one is how long after disclosure exploitation actually begins. This board measures exactly that, across the entire CISA KEV corpus: KEV dateAdded − NVD published, for every catalogued vulnerability. Both sources are authoritative, so every figure here is independently reproducible.

Correlating KEV against NVD…

The window closing

median days, by KEV year

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Runway by vendor

2023+, shortest first

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METHOD & LIMITS

CISA seeded KEV in November 2021 with a large historical backfill, so 2021–2022 entries measure cataloguing latency, not weaponization speed — their medians run to years and pooling them would be a measurement error. Every headline figure above is computed on the 2023-onward subset; the chart shows all years so you can see the break for yourself. Two further limits, stated rather than buried: dateAdded records when CISA confirmed exploitation, which lags first exploitation by an unknown margin, so these are an upper bound — the real runway is shorter, never longer. And KEV is a selected sample of what CISA tracks for federal risk, not a census of everything exploited in the wild.

FILE 03f · EXTORTION ECONOMY · DLS TELEMETRY

Reading the leak sites

Ransomware crews run victim-shaming portals as Tor hidden services. Organizations get posted there hours to days before any press coverage — which makes leak-site monitoring one of the earliest public signals in all of threat intelligence. This board reduces that feed to what actually matters: which crews are operating, at what tempo, and who they're selecting. Aggregated via ransomware.live.

Connecting to DLS aggregator…

Operator tempo

postings per crew

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Sector selection

who they're picking

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Geography

victim country

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COLLECTION ETHICS

This board shows aggregate counts only. I deliberately withhold victim organization names and every .onion address, and the endpoint never emits them to the browser. Victims of extortion are crime victims — republishing their names adds pressure and produces no analytic value that the trend data doesn't already carry. Naming targets is what the crews want; counting them is what defenders need.

FILE 03g · ADVERSARY TRADECRAFT → DETECTION

How they get in, and what catches them

You cannot defend a technique you don't understand offensively. Each card below is a tradecraft pattern dominating 2026 intrusions, paired with the telemetry that actually detects it. No exploit code — the deliverable of red-team knowledge on a blue team is detection logic.

T1078

Valid accounts · the malware-free intrusion

TRADECRAFT

The dominant modern intrusion drops no payload at all. Operators buy or phish credentials, authenticate through the front door, and inherit the user's trust. CrowdStrike put 82% of 2025 detections in the malware-free category. There is no hash to blocklist and no file to quarantine.

DETECTION

Identity telemetry becomes the primary sensor. Alert on first-seen ASN or device for a principal, impossible-travel deltas, interactive logon by a service account, and MFA-fatigue push patterns. The signal is deviation from that identity's baseline, not badness in a file.

T1218

Living off the land · signed binary proxy

TRADECRAFT

Execution is proxied through Microsoft-signed binaries already present and trusted: rundll32, regsvr32, mshta, certutil, msbuild. Blocklisting them breaks Windows, so they survive allowlisting by construction.

DETECTION

Baseline legitimate parent-child lineage, then alert on the anomaly: rundll32 with no command line, Office spawning a script host, certutil invoked with -urlcache or -decode. My Detect Lab ships a tested rule for exactly this certutil transfer pattern, gated in CI against false positives.

T1562

Blinding the sensor · telemetry tampering

TRADECRAFT

Before acting, capable operators degrade visibility: patching ETW providers in-process, removing userland hooks, or stopping the agent outright. The intrusion continues in a gap where nothing is being written down.

DETECTION

Monitor telemetry integrity, and treat absence of signal as signal. A host that stops heartbeating, an ETW provider that goes quiet, or a sensor version that silently rolls back should page someone. Enable tamper protection so the disable attempt itself is the alert.

T1190

Edge devices · the appliance blind spot

TRADECRAFT

VPN concentrators, firewalls, and file-transfer appliances sit internet-facing and cannot run an EDR agent. Crews operationalize n-days within days of disclosure and land in the one place the security stack cannot see.

DETECTION

Ship appliance syslog to the SIEM as a first-class source, diff running configs on a schedule, and alert on any outbound session originating from a management plane that should only ever receive. My Emerging Exposure board exists to shorten the window on exactly this class of CVE.

T1497

Sandbox evasion · detonating only for real targets

TRADECRAFT

Sandbox and VM evasion was 2026's fastest-growing technique, climbing to the top five. Payloads fingerprint the host — domain membership, uptime, user artifacts, CPU count — and simply exit clean inside analysis environments.

DETECTION

Detonate in environments with realistic decoy artifacts and aged profiles, and extend observation past timer-based delays. Treat early clean exit as suspicious in itself: a sample that checks the environment and quits has told you something about its intent.

T1567

Exfil-only extortion · skipping encryption

TRADECRAFT

Encryption for impact (T1486) fell roughly 38% relative in 2026. Crews increasingly steal and threaten without ever encrypting: it is quieter, keeps the host alive for continued access, and still monetizes. The leak-site tempo on the board above is this shift, measured.

DETECTION

The detonation-time trigger never fires, so detection moves left to data movement. Baseline egress volume per host and per identity, alert on archive utilities and rclone-class transfer tooling, and watch for bulk reads against file shares that a given account has never touched before.

Technique IDs are MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise. Prevalence figures reflect published 2025–2026 industry telemetry from CrowdStrike, Red Canary, and Picus; they are cited as reported, not independently measured by me.

FILE 03h · INFRASTRUCTURE & DETECTION LABS

Infrastructure I build to break and defend

Reading about SIEM, Active Directory, and mail security isn't the same as running them. These are infrastructure-as-code labs I stand up, attack, and then hunt in the logs — the full detection loop on infrastructure I control. Everything here is real, runnable code; each card links the build you can clone and run yourself.

SIEM Detection Lab

SIEM · ELK

Elasticsearch + Kibana + Filebeat, with detections as code

  • Single-node ELK stack via Docker Compose — collect, ship, index, detect, alert
  • Seeded attack story: brute-force burst (T1110) then a valid-account success (T1078)
  • Detection engine in Python: rules are readable JSON → Elasticsearch aggregations → alerts
  • Every rule mapped honestly to the ATT&CK technique it actually catches

The point isn't a dashboard — it's the analyst loop end to end, on infrastructure I own and can rebuild in minutes.

Active Directory Lab

AD · ATT&CK

A domain you provision from code, attack, then catch in the logs

  • Vagrant + PowerShell: Server 2022 DC (lab.local) and a domain-joined Win10 workstation
  • Audit policy tuned so the right Event IDs actually fire (4624/4625, 4769, 5136)
  • Attack-and-detect exercises: Kerberoasting (T1558.003) and password spray (T1110)
  • Each exercise pairs the attack with the exact Windows telemetry and detection query

You can't reliably detect what you've never watched happen. This lab is where I watch it happen — inside my own domain, on accounts built for the purpose.

Mail / Exchange Lab

EMAIL DEFENSE

Self-hosted mail stack for phishing and header analysis

  • Full SMTP/IMAP + webmail + anti-spam stack (Mailu) via Docker Compose
  • Practice SPF / DKIM / DMARC pass-and-fail, and watch DMARC stop a spoof
  • Received:-chain and Authentication-Results triage — the core of phishing analysis
  • Documented path to a full Windows Server + Exchange eval build for the name-brand version

Real Exchange needs Windows Server and licensing; this teaches the same defensive surface on a laptop, with the Exchange upgrade path written down.

CI/CD Security Gates

DEVSECOPS

Pipelines that fail the build on a security regression

  • GitLab CI on CivicPulse: SAST and secret detection gate every merge
  • Detect Lab: detection rules ship with tests, gated in CI against false positives
  • Security treated as a build stage, not a manual afterthought
  • Same discipline applied to this site: it patches on git push

Not a lab I spun up for show — this is how the projects in FILE 06 are actually built. The evidence is in the pipelines.

FILE 04 · RESEARCH & DISCLOSURE

Original analysis, and how I disclose

Threat-intelligence work I measured myself, with the collection method published so you can reproduce or dispute it, alongside the coordinated-disclosure process I hold myself to.

FILE 05 · LIVE OPERATIONS

Shipped demos you can click right now

Every card below is a working deployment or a live GitHub repo, not mockups. Open a demo in the theater or jump straight to source.

·public repos
·last push
github.com/SSH-PuR66 ↗
sergrdz.pages.dev

Select a demo below · iframe loads on click · piper booking page also live

GitHub activity feed

Syncing repos…

FILE 06 · SHIPPED PROJECTS

Built, deployed, documented

VaultForge

Cryptography

Local-first password manager: AES-256 encryption, secure authentication, cryptographically strong generation, zero cloud dependency by design.

  • Python
  • AES-256
  • Local-first

LicenseLoop

Full stack

License & permit tracker with automated email reminders at 30/7/1 days before expiry. User auth, tiered free/pro plans, Stripe billing, cron-secured task endpoints.

  • FastAPI
  • SQLModel
  • Docker
  • Stripe

CivicPulse

Data / DevSecOps

Open-government dashboard on U.S. Census ACS data. Async httpx ingestion, TTL caching, Chart.js visualization, WCAG-conscious accessibility, with GitLab CI enforcing SAST and secret detection before every merge.

  • FastAPI
  • httpx
  • Chart.js
  • GitLab CI

This portfolio

Serverless

Hand-built with vanilla HTML/CSS/JS on Cloudflare Pages, live threat-feed ticker and AI assistant run as serverless Pages Functions, shipped with hardened security headers.

  • Cloudflare Pages
  • Pages Functions
  • Vanilla JS

NovaMind AI

AI product

AI business-assistant landing page with a live Workers AI demo and contact capture through Cloudflare Pages Functions.

  • Workers AI
  • Pages Functions

FlowForge

SaaS landing

Dental-practice automation landing page: ROI calculator, workflow template previews, and lead capture, optimized for Cloudflare Pages.

  • JavaScript
  • Cloudflare Pages

Cheat Sheet Downloader

Automation

Python scraper that extracts structured reference material and generates clean, formatted PDF cheat sheets.

  • Python
  • BeautifulSoup
FILE 07 · SERVICE RECORD

Experience, service & honors

2023, PRESENT

Competitive Bagpiper, Capital Youth District Pipe Band

1st place, North American Championship (Youth, Aug 2025). 8th place, World Championship, Glasgow (Aug 2024). Multiple piping scholarships, 2023–2026.

NOV 2024, JAN 2025

Sales Associate, Kohl's, Wappingers Falls NY

Customer service, transactions, and holiday-rush operations in a high-volume retail environment.

SUMMER 2024

Volunteer, Dutchess Outreach & Loan Closet

Meal service for food-insecure neighbors; assisted elderly clients with medical equipment rentals at Poughkeepsie Reformed Church.

MAY, SEP 2023

Park Attendant, Splashdown Beach, Fishkill NY

Guest safety and high-volume operations during peak summer season.

Honors & scholarships

  • 1st North American Bagpiping Championship, Youth Division, 2025
  • 8th World Bagpiping Championship, Glasgow, 2024
  • $23k Iona University Merit Scholarship
  • $5k Monmouth College, highest bagpipe scholarship (recommended)
  • AWD Iona Spirit & Performing Arts Award · Alumni Award · Gael Service Award
  • SCH St. Andrew's Society of Schenectady (2024, 2025) · Invermark (2023, 2026) · Balmoral (2024, 2025) · GlasgowLands
FILE 08 · MISSION OBJECTIVE, PORTIONS REDACTED

Where this is headed

Hover (or tab to) any redaction to declassify.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: Take cybercrime off the board, ransomware crews, fraud networks, and the infrastructure they run on.

THEATER OF INTEREST: Overseas operations, Middle East posting, where cyber and national security intersect hardest.

TARGET TRACKS: FBI Cyber Division, Honors Internship · NSA student programs & Codebreaker Challenge · CIA digital-targeting pathways · CISA / DHS cyber.

CURRENT PHASE: Building the record that opens those doors, verified certifications, shipped defensive tooling, a Security Threat & Analysis degree, and the public body of work you're reading right now.

— RODRIGUEZ, S.W. APPROVED FOR RELEASE

MISSION STATUSACTIVE
NEXT MILESTONESecurity internship · Summer 2027
DEGREE TRACKB.S. Cybersecurity, Threat & Analysis
DISCIPLINE PROOFInternational championship competitor
FILE 09 · ESTABLISH CONTACT

Open a channel

Security roles, collaborations, or hard questions. I respond fast.

SR-Assist

An AI briefed on this dossier. Ask it anything about my skills, tools, or availability.

Channel open. Ask me about Sergio's certifications, security tooling, projects, or how to hire him.